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DOES THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT DEPEND
ON THE ONTOLOGICAL?
William F. Vallicella

Does the cosmological argument (CA) depend on the ontological (OA)?
That depends. If the OA is an argument "from mere concepts," then no; if
the OA is an argument from possibility, then yes. That is my main thesis.
Along the way, I explore a number of subsidiary themes, among them, the
nature of proof in metaphysics, and what Kant calls the "mystery of
absolute necessity."

Both in his pre-Critical Sale Possible Basis for a Proof of the Existenc[' of God
(1763) and in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant maintains that the
(Leibniz-Wolff) cosmological argument depends on the ontological. As he
puts it in the first Critique,
... the so-called cosmological proof really owes any cogency which it
may have to the ontological proof from mere concepts. The appeal to
experience is quite superfluous ... '
Of course, Kant does not urge this thesis in praise of the cosmological argument, but to bury it: the ontological argument fails, and the cosmological
argument, as depending on the former, fails with it.
Various attempts have been made to show that there is no such dependency as Kant alleges, the most impressive being that of J. William Forgie.'
When Tfirst read Forgie's two recent articles on this topic, T thought he had
definitively refuted Kant's dependency thesis. But I now see, or think I see,
that the shade of Kant has a plausible rejoinder.

1. What is Cogency?
Since the claimed dependence of the cosmological argument (CA) on the
ontological argument (OA) is in respect of cogency, we need to know what
this is. "Cogency" is Norman Kemp Smith's rendering of Beweiskraft
which is literally, and I think more perspicuously, translated as "probative
force" especially since Kant speaks of theistic proofs rather than arguments.
In keeping with his project of ascertaining the cognitive value of metaphysica specialis, Kant is not concerned with a narrowly logical critique of the
arguments of natural theology, but with an epistemological determination
of their fitness for producing genuine knowledge. His concern is whether
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these arguments amount to proofs. How do proofs stand to arguments?
Although every proof is an argument, not every argument, even if valid, is
a proof. A valid argument with a false premise is surely no proof of anything,
but a sound one isn't either: it is not enough that a putative proof be valid with
true premises; it must also have premises which are known to be true, at least
by the producers and consumers of the argument. But even this does not suffice: a circular argument could satisfy the foregoing conditions without
amounting to a proof. If one cannot know the premises of an argument to be
true without knowing the conclusion to be true, then the argument in question
is surely no proof. Now consider the following argument: "r am now breathing; therefore, either Kant lived in Koenigsberg or he did not." This argument
exhibits the foregoing four marks. It is valid, has true premises known to be
true, and it is noncircular. But it does not prove its conclusion. Thus we need
to impose a fifth condition, relevance of conclusion to premises. r suggest that
the foregoing five marks are individually necessary conditions of probativeness; whether they are jointly sufficient r leave undecided. Thus a deductive
argument is probative only if it is (i) valid in point of logical form, has (ii) true
premises that are (iii) known to be true, (iv) avoids petitio principii, and (v) is
such that the premises are relevant to the conclusion.3
Proofs in metaphysics, for Kant at least, must meet further conditions. It
is important to appreciate just how Teutonically stringent Kant's notion of
metaphysical proof is. A proof in metaphysics is either apodeictic (apodiktisch) or it is no proof at all (A789 B817). Such proofs proceed from unimpeachable premises with rigorous logic to conclusions that are demonstratively certain. Kant heaps scorn upon the supposition that there could be
probabilistic arguments in metaphysics. At A775 B803 he remarks that to
try to prove that God "is probable is as absurd (ungereimt) as to think of
proving a proposition of geometry merely as a probability."4 Metaphysics
is knowledge by pure theoretical reason, and what pure reason knows it
either knows a priori and as necessary, or it doesn't know it at all. This is
especially so with God, who exists of absolute metaphysical necessity if he
exists at all. "For the knowledge of what we profess to know as absolutely
necessary must itself carry with it absolute necessity." (A612 B640)
To say that the knowledge of what we claim to know as absolutely necessary must itself carry with it absolute necessity says more than that the
proposition to be known (the conclusion of the proof) must be necessarily
true; it says that the knowing of the necessarily true proposition must bring
with it insight into how and that the proposition is necessarily true. A
"proof" of a necessary truth that does not amount to a proof of the necessity of its conclusion, by providing insight into how it is possible for its conclusion to be necessary, is no proof at all. Thus, to invoke a distinction
Kant makes at A789 B817, a God-proof cannot be "apagogical" (apagogisch)
but must be "ostensive" (ostensiv) or "direct" (direkt). If the reader finds
this obscure, section 7 infra should clarify matters.

2. Different Dependencies Distinguished
Having in effect distinguished the rich epistemological concept of probativeness from the lean logical concept of soundness, where this is under-
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stood in the standard way as a property of those arguments whose form is
valid and whose premises are true, we should distinguish two dependency
questions. But before distinguishing them, we need to clarify the notion of
argument-dependency in general. To say that argument A is dependent
upon argument B is to say at least this much: A cannot be probative or
sound unless B is probative or sound. To show that argument A is not
dependent on argument B, then, it suffices to show that A's being sound or
probative does not entail B's being sound or probative. Thus to show that
the CA does not depend on the OA, it suffices to show that the CA's being
sound or probative does not entail the OA's being sound or probative.
Now for the two dependency questions. (Q1) Is the CA dependent for its
probativeness on the OA? (Q2) Is the CA dependent for its soundness on the
OA? We should be open to the possibility that these questions have different answers. Take (Q2) first. The CA is soundness-dependent on the OA
just in case the CA cannot be sound (in any version) unless the OA is sound
(in some version). Richard Gale seems to be making a case for soundnessdependence when he writes that a "successful" cosmological argument
" ... must ultimately terminate with a self-explaining explainer, in which a
self-explaining being is one whose existence is entailed by its nature or
essence, that is, one for whom there is a successful ontological argument. us
Gale's case for soundness-dependence seems correct. A successful CA must
terminate with a being whose essence entails its existence, and if so, how
could there fail to be a sound OA for this conclusion? Here is an example:
A being whose essence entails its existence is possible.
A being whose essence entails its existence is either impossible or exists.
Therefore, a being whose essence entails its existence exists.
Clearly, this version of the OA is sound if any version of the CA is sound.
We may answer (Q2) in the affirmative. So there is a clear, if rather uninteresting, sense in which the CA is dependent on the OA: the first is soundness-dependent on the second.
But Gale muddies the waters with his use of "successful." I should
think that a successful argument would be a probative argument, and not
merely a sound one. If "successful" means "probative," then perhaps one
can plausibly argue that the answer to (Ql) should be in the negative.
Although the CA cannot be sound unless the OA is, it may well turn out
that a version of the CA is probative even though every version of the OA
is not. But before we can see how this could be so, we must delve into
Kant's argument.

3. Kant's Dependency Argument
The cosmological argument as Kant understands it involves three steps, as
he makes clear in the 1763 essay.' The first step purports to take us from a
contingent being or a world of contingent beings to a being upon which
they depend for their existence. The second step aims to show that this
being exists of absolute metaphysical necessity. The third step tries to establish that this ens necessarium (EN) is God, the ens realissimliln (ER), the maxi-

444

Faith

IIl1d

Philosophy

mally real or maximally perfect being.? In the first Critique, Kant lumps the
first two steps together, the better to focus on his primary worry, the move
from the necessary world-ground to God. Having argued a cOlltingentia
mundi to a necessary being, how can we show that this being has the attributes definitive of God? It is here that Kant thinks the cosmological arguer
must have recourse to the ontological argument. Kant's argument for the
dependence of the CA on the OA is most succinctly put in his Lectures Oil
Philosophical Theology8 from his Critical period and I will take these, supplemented by passages from CPR, as the basis for the following discussion.
Kant in effect invites us to consider the following stretch of argumentation which appears to bring the CA to a successful completion.
1. There is a being that exists of absolute necessity. (Upshot of first

half of CA)

2. "the requisites of absolute necessity are met with solely in the concept of a most real being." (LPT 61)
Therefore
3. "the absolutely necessary being is the most real being." (LPT 6])

Therefore
4. The absolutely necessary being is God.

But, Kant claims, to accept (2) is to endorse the OA. The argument for
this claim may be set forth as follows:
5. If "every absolutely necessary being is also a most real being,"
then "every most real being is an absolutely necessary being.'"
6. The consequent of (5) is "determined

a priori from mere con-

cepts."(LPT 62)
Therefore

en tis realissimi must carry its own absolute
necessity along with it."(LPT 62)

7. "the mere concept of an

Therefore
8. The existence of a most real being follows from its concept, which
is precisely what the OA implies.

Therefore
9. The CA is probative only if the OA is, and is therefore dependent

on it.
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4. The Bennett-Forgie Response to Kant's Dependency Argument
Forgie claims in effect that a cosmological arguer, with perfect consistency,
can accept (7) while rejecting (8), and thus can insist that the appeal to
experience in the first half of the CA, far from being superfluous, is indispensable. Jonathan Bennett maintains something similar.lO
This is a plausible line to take. No doubt the concept of a most real or
maximally perfect being is the concept of something which, if it exists, necessarily exists, and indeed from its own nature or essence. It is the concept
of something which has a certain modal status, the status of existing either
in all possible worlds or in none. Taken in this way, (7) is clearly true, but
consistent with the denial of (8). For whether the ens realissimum exists in
fact cannot be "read off" from the concept, as Kant himself would surely
agree: " .. .if I take the concept of anything, no matter what, I find that the
existence of this thing can never be represented by me as absolutely necessary, and that, whatever it may be that exists, nothing prevents me from
thinking its non-existence." (A615 B643) This is why the ontological argument, which Kant (mis?)represents as an argument "from mere concepts"
(alls lnuter Begrif!en), lacks probative force." One cannot settle questions of
existence by conceptual analysis. For with respect to every concept, or at
least every concept the notes of whose conceptual content are compossible,
it is always a further question whether anything instantiates it. (Questions
of nonexistence are a different story: one can ontologically disprove round
squares and the like.)
It thus appears that Forgie has put his finger on the flaw in Kant's dependency argument, namely, the inference from (7) to (8). But one ought to
find it puzzling that Kant, who himself makes what Bennett calls the "conditionalizing move" in refutation of the OA (the retreat from "The ens rt~alis
simum necessarily exists" to "If it exists, then the ens realissimum necessarily
exists") will not allow this move to the cosmological arguer. Why does
Kant think that the inference from (7) to (H) is valid given his own convicticm that nothing is such that its existence follows from its concept?
There is an argument Kant could employ to forge a logical link between
(7) and (8):
a. "absolute necessity is an existence from mere concepts." (LPT 62)
b. The concept of the ER is the concept of something that exists of
absolute necessity.
Therefore
c. The concept of the ER is the concept of something whose existence
follows from its concept.12
So given premise (a), one can derive (c) which is equivalent to (8). It follows that Forgie's rejection of the inference from (7) to (8) is premised on a
rejection of (a). The obvious way to reject (a) is by claiming that absolute
necessity is an existence from essence or possibility, and not from concepts.

446

Faith and Philosophy

One could then consistently maintain that the ER's essence entails its existence without its existence~ being ontologically provable "from mere concepts." One could consistently hold that the CA is free of entanglement
with the OA "from mere concepts."
Although Forgie's position is entirely consistent, it appears that
Bennett's is not. Bennett, invoking the conditionalizing move, rejects (in
effect) the inference from (7) to (8) and concludes that Kant has altogether failed in his attempt to show that the cosmological arguer who takes the
second step [from the EN to the ER] is committed to the validity of the
ontological argument."n As rejecting the move from (7) to (8), Bennett
must reject (a). But Bennett goes on to make a "radical criticism" of the CA
which he sees Kant as poised to make without actually making, a criticism
that rests on the truth of (a).14 The radical criticism is that there simply cannot be a logically (broadly logically, metaphysically) necessary being for
either the CA or the OA to terminate in. For if nothing is such that its existence follows from its concept, as Kant maintains in his critique of the OA,
then nothing can exist of absolute logical necessity. But this last inference
requires for its validity premise (a): "absolute necessity is an existence from
mere concepts." If absolute necessity is an existence from possibility or
essence, the inference does not succeed. For we have just seen how one
can countenance an ens necessarium that is not ontologically provable "from
mere concepts."
The upshot is that Bennett cannot have it both ways: he cannot reject
Kant's dependency argument while accepting the principle that "absolute
necessity is an existence from mere concepts." Given that he accepts the
latter and the radical criticism based on it, he should accept the dependencyargument.
This leaves the question whether Kant himself accepts the radical criticism and (a). I shall take this up below in section 8.
Thus it would seem that the cosmological arguer can take the following
seemingly consistent position. (i) The OA "from mere concepts" fails, and
indeed for the reason Kant adduces. Nevertheless, (ii) a thing is maximally
perfect if and only if it exists of absolute necessity. Now, (iii) we have (let
us assume) an a posteriori proof of the existence of an absolutely necessary
being upon which all contingent beings depend. Therefore, (iv) we have
an a posteriori proof of the existence of a maximally perfect being which
proof does not depend for its probativeness on the OA.
This is not to say that our a posteriori proof is not dependent for its
soundness on the OA. Of course it is. For if the proposition expressed by
liThe maximally perfect being exists" is true, then there must be sound
ontological arguments which feature it as a conclusion. Example: "If the
maximally perfect being is Itself, then it is." (Inspired by Bonaventura's, Si
DCllS Deus est, DCllS est.) But soundness is not the issue; probativeness is.
Forgie appears to have shown that the CA is not probativeness-dependent
on theOA.
As Forgie of course realizes, the position just sketched, according to
which the CA's appeal to experience is indispensable, implies that the
proposition expressed by itA maximally perfect being exists" is both necessary and knowable only a posteriori. Propositions that enjoy this status are
1t •••
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not exactly unknown to recent philosophy. Thus one could say that it is
Kant's failure to make room in his system for propositions of this type that
underlies his dependency argument.
We should also note that if there are necessary truths knowable only a
posteriori, then, since these cannot be conceptual truths, they must be truths
grounded in essences distinct from concepts. Armed with a distinction
between concept and essence, a distinction Kant does not make, we can
easily see how a position like that of Thomas Aquinas is consistent. Thomas
both rejected Anselm's proof and held that God's existence is entailed by,
indeed is identical with, his essence. This is consistent if absolute necessitv
is an existence from essence rather than an existence from concepts.
Aquinas commentators often claim that the sort of necessity that figures
in the proofs of the quinquae viae is distinct from the Leibnizian sort of
necessity (existence in all logically Imetaphysically possible worlds) at
work in the versions of the CA on which Kant set his critical sights, and
that therefore Kant's dependency thesis, whether true or false, simply does
not apply to the cosmological or contingency arguments of the doctor
angelicus. The operative sort of necessity in Aquinas is said to be lack of
generability I corruptibility and cognates. But as Forgie rightly points out,
"although Aquinas may well use a notion of 'necessary being' which is different from the Leibnizian one, his notion of an uncaused necessary being
entails or involves the Leibnizian notion of a being whose essence involves
its existence."15 It is difficult to see how such an uncaused necessary being
would not fall within the scope of Kant's dependency thesis. Besides, how
could an ontologically simple God, one in which essence is existence, fail to
have the sort of Leibnizian necessity that would make all arguments in
support of it subject to Kant's dependency thesis?
0

5. A Dependency Argument Immune to the Bennett-Forgie Objection
Forgie's main point seems clearly correct, namely, that (8) does not follow
from (7) above. Although the concept of the ens realissimllln (ER) is the concept of something which, if it exists, necessarily exists, it does not follow
from the mere concept that it exists. So Forgie thinks that (i) the cosmological arguer need not endorse the OA, and (ii) that the appeal to experience
is indispensable to show that something satisfies the concept of the ER.
But we should note that although the existence of the ER does not follow
from its concept - since nothing is such that its existence follows from its
concept - the existence of the ER docs follow from its possibility.
So if it can be shown that the CA presupposes the possibility of the ER,
then the CA will be dependent for its probativeness on a modal OA along
the lines of: The ER is possible; if the ER is possible, then it exists; therefore,
the ER exists. Ontological arguments like these are not "from mere concepts" (aus lauter Begriffen), and so do not make the mistake of inferring
existence from a concept. My new and improved dependency argument
may be outlined as follows.
10. Either the CA proves that the ER is possible, or it presupposes'"
that the ER is possible.
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11. The CA cannot be taken to prove that the ER is possible.
Therefore
12. The CA presupposes that the ER is possible.
13. If the CA presupposes that the ER is possible, then the CA
depends on the OA.
Therefore
14. The CA depends on the OA.
Premise (10) is self-evident. But premises (11) and (13) require argument.
Argument for (11). If a thing is actual, then it is possible. (Ab esse ad
posse valet illatia.) So if I know that a thing is actual, then I know that it is
possible. This is consistent with not understanding how the thing is possible. For example, I can reasonably claim to know that such things as
motion, temporal passage, and relatedness occur, and are thus possible,
without understanding how they are possible. (The powerful arguments
of Zeno, McTaggart, and Bradley respectively, purport to show that these
things are not possible, and in my opinion these arguments, though they
have been ably opposed, have never been decisively refuted. Thus these
arguments show that we do not understand how motion, temporal passage, and relatedness are possible.) But to the extent that I do not understand how a thing is possible, I am justified in wondering whether the
thing in question really is actual, and thus really is possible. Thus my
inability to understand how libertarian freedom of the will is possible, may
lead me to justified doubts about its existence. '7 And if I have justified
doubts about its existence, then I am justified in doubting whether my
putative knowledge of its existence is genuine knowledge.
Thus although it is obviously true that everything actual is possible, the
application of this principle in an attempt to prove that a given thing is
possible is stymied by (i) doubts whether the thing in question really is
actual, which are especially troublesome when the thing is not sense-perceivable, and (ii) lack of insight into how it could be possible, with (ij) fanning the flames of (D. So I think one must conclude that no CA could be
taken to prove the possibility of the ER by proving its actuality. For as
Kant remarks, we have no insight into how the ER is possible. In an
uncharacteristically "Heideggerian" passage at CPR A613 B641, Kant
speaks of unconditional necessity as an "abyss" (Abgrund) for human reason where "all support fails us." In trying to secure a Grund for all things,
we plunge into an Abgrund. Since everything we can represent as existent
we can just as easily represent as nonexistent (CPR A615 B643), we have no
insight into how there could be something that exists of absolute necessity.
Of course it doesn't follow that there cannot be an absolutely necessary
being; it could easily exist without our understanding how it could exist.
(And Kant never denies or even seriously doubts the existence of God.)
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The point is that we cannot know how or that an absolutely necessary
being is possible through theoretical reason, though we can think and
believe this possibility. (d. Bxxvi) One does well to recall that Kant's attack
on metaphysical knowledge is not motivated by a desire to undermine religious belief, but by a desire to insulate it from sceptical corrosion: "I have
found it necessary to deny knowledge (Wissen) in order to make room for
faith (Glauben)."" We cannot prove God's existence, but we cannot disprove it either.
Having seen that (11) is true, we may infer (12): the CA presupposes
that the ER is possible. But if so, then the CA depends on the OA for its
probativeness.
To appreciate this, recall that the problem for the second half of the CA
is whether or not one can show that the ens necessarium (EN) is the ens
realissimum (ER). This is a question of identification, a question of specifying which being this necessary being is. But the attempt to identify the EN
with the ER presupposes that the ER is possible. '9 For something that has
been proven to exist (the EN) cannot be identified with something that is
impossible. Now the ER either necessarily exists or is impossible, which
implies that its possibility entails its actual existence. So if the attempt to
identify the EN with the ER presupposes that the ER is possible, then the
success of this attempt presupposes that an OA such as the following is
probative, and not just sound:
The ellS rCl1lissimum is possible
Either the ens realissill111m is impossible or it is necessarily existent
Therefore
The ens realissimum is necessarily existent.
So it would seem that the CA is after all dependent on the OA, and that the
appeal to experience is superfluous. For if the CA cannot attain its ultimate
goal without presupposing in its second half the real possibility of the ER,
then one can simply begin with this possibility and "run" some such OA as
the one just given. The recourse to experience would then be an unnecessary detour.
My point, then, is that something like Kant's dependency thesis can be
defended if we distinguish, as Kant did not, the OA " from mere concepts"
from the OA from possibility. Forgie is right that the CA does not depend
for its probativeness on the OA "from mere concepts." The concept of the
ER is the concept of something that necessarily exists given that it does
exist; but that it does exist cannot be inferred from its mere concept. But
given the real (not merely excogitated) possibility of the ER, it follows
straightaway that the ER exists. Note that this un-Kanhan distinction
between the concept and the possibility (essence) of the ER is one that
Forgie himself invokes and must invoke in order to defeat Kant's dependency thesis. (We saw last section that Bennett falls into contradiction
when he tries to reject Kant's dependency thesis while holding onto the
principle that absolute necessity is an existence from mere concepts.) So
although the CA does not depend on the OA "from mere concepts," it does
depend for its probativeness on the OA from possibility.
This dependence is damaging to the CA since there is reason to think
that the OA from possibility is not probative. 2l ) For how can one show that
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the ER is really possible? It is part of Kant's point that one cannot show
this by any analysis of concepts. Leibniz, who thought he could prove the
possibility of the ER by showing that the realities (perfections) that make
up the divine nature are compos sible (since they are all positive) "confused
the possibility of this concept [that of the ERl with the possibility of the
thing itself." (LPT 55)

6. Dependency in the First Half of the CA
If there is a being whose existence is necessary for the existence of all else, it
of course does not follow that this being is necessary in itself. It is a point of
modal logic that one cannot validly pass from "Necessarily, if U then G," to
"If U, then necessarily G." To think otherwise is to confuse the necessitas
consequentiae with the necessitas consequentiis. If there must be a being on
which contingent beings depend, then this being is conditionally necessary;
but it does not follow straightaway that it is unconditionally necessary.
So one might legitimately wonder whether even the first half of the CA
can attain its goal. It is supposed to take us from contingent beings to an
absolutely or unconditionally necessary being upon which they depend for
their existence. In its first step, as Kant explains in the 1763 essay, it takes
us to an independent being, one on which all else depends. 21 But how, in
its second step, can it negotiate the passage from "An independent being
exists" to "An absolutely necessary being exists"? Kant does not press this
point in the first Critique, but he could have, and passages elsewhere show
that he is well aware of it. "In the Wolffian proof one can indeed discern
the independence, but not the inner necessity [of the first cause or ultimate
ground]; for its existence is only necessary for the sake of the world."22
It is clear that if there is an absolutely necessary ground G, then its possibility entails its actual existence. So all the first half of the CA needs to
prove is the possibility of G. But for the reasons given in the preceding section, no CA can prove the possibility of an unconditionally necessary being.
Not being able to prove it, it must presuppose it. But if the first half of the CA
presupposes the possibility of G, then surely there is no need for an a posteriori proof of its actuality: if we are given G's possibility, then we can simply
"run" an ontological argument to establish its actuality. So it seems that the
first half of the CA, and not just the second half, depends on an OA from
possibility, so that, once more, the appeal to experience is superfluous. But
of course this is consistent with denying, as I do deny, that the first half of
the CA depends on the OA "from mere concepts."

7. Call One Prove the Necessary from the Contillgent?
Since any CA must have as its conclusion a necessary proposition, this raises the question: Can there be a probative argument for an unconditionally
necessary proposition when one of the premises of the argument is contingent? If no, then we have another reason to think that the CA is dependent
upon the OA. Recall that for Kant, proofs in metaphysics, "transcendental
proofs,"23 must be ostensive and not apagogical (A789 B817) where an
ostensive proof is "one which combines with the conviction of its truth
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[better: conviction of the truth of its conclusion] insight into the sources of
its truth [better: insight into the sources of its conclusion's truth]." What
Kant has to say about the distinction I find obscure;24 part of what I will be
attempting in this section is to attach a tolerably clear sense to "ostensive
proof."
No doubt there are sound arguments with contingent premises and necessary conclusions. Trivial example: "Simone Weil died in 1943; therefore,
either Hillary is furious or she is not." This is a sound argument for a necessary proposition: the premise is true and the argument's form is valid,
i.e., not possibly such that any argument of this form has true premises and
a false conclusion. Nontrivial example:
15. I am now thinking
Therefore
16. It is true that I am now thinking
Therefore
17. There are truths.
This is a sound argument in which the premise is contingently true and the
final conclusion is necessary. That (17) is necessary can be proved by a
quick reductio: If there are no truths, then it is true that there are no truths;
but if it is true that there are no truths, then there is at least one truth,
namely, the truth that there are no truths. But this contradicts the assumption that there are no truths. Therefore, the assumption is false, and there
are truths. On the other hand, if there are truths, then of course there are
truths. Therefore, necessarily, there are truths.
Argument (15)-(17), then, is an interesting case, since it seems to show
that I can come to know a necessary truth by inferring it from a contingent
premise which I clearly know. It seems to amount to an a posteriori proof of
the necessary existence of truths. So it appears to be not just sound, but
probative.
But here we need a distinction. Although the argument to (17) is probative, I claim that the argument to
17*. Necessarily, there are truths
is not. It is one thing to come to know a necessary truth; it is another to
come to know it as necessary. I can know a truth that is necessary without
knowing that it is necessary. Almost everyone knows that 2 + 2 = 4, and
thus almost everyone knows at least one necessary truth; but relatively few
know that, necessarily, 2 + 2 = 4, even though these two propositions are
logically equivalent. So even if there are a posteriori proofs of necessary
truths, it is a further question whether they can deliver insight into the
necessity of necessary truths. If they cannot, then one may doubt whether
they are fully probative.
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Suppose we want to prove that there are necessary truths to the Modal
Fool who says in his heart: All is contingent! We get him to admit that he
is thinking, that it is true that he is thinking, and that therefore there are
truths. Although we have gotten him to accept a necessary truth, he won't
see it as such. He will reply that it is contingent that there are truths, and
perhaps contingent upon the existence of human beings. How do we
show him that it is necessarily true that there are truths? My point is that
we cannot use an a posteriori argument. For even if we can come to know a
posteriori propositions that are necessarily true, we cannot come to know a
posteriori that they have this high modal status. To prove to the Modal Fool
that it is necessarily true that there are truths, we must have recourse to
some such a priori proof as the reductio ad absurdum given above. The a posteriori proof "really owes any cogency which it may have" to the a priori
proof; "the appeal to experience is quite superfluous."
Similarly, a probative CA must not only bring us to the knowledge that
a ground of contingent beings exists which is absolutely necessary, but also
to the knowledge that this ground is indeed absolutely necessary. Thus a
probative CA cannot merely demonstrate the truth of "God exists" (where
this is a necessary truth), but must demonstrate, i.e., generate knowledge of
the truth of, "Necessarily, God exists." And this latter is what an a posteriori proof cannot deliver.

8. The Mystery of Absolute Necessity
Kant represents a watershed in the history of the theistic proofs the central
concept of which is that of the ens necessarium. As befits a watershed,
Kant's thinking teeters ambiguously between the view that (i) the ens necessarium is possible but not provable theoretically either in its actual existence or in its possibility, and the view that (ii) the ens necessarium is impossible. Here is a passage in support of (i):
Thus, while for the merely speculative employment of reason the
supreme being remains a mere ideal, it is yet an ideal without a flaw .. .Its
objective reality cannot indeed be proved, but also cannot be disproved, by merely speculative reason. lf, then, there should be a moral
theology that can make good this deficiency, transcendental theology,
which before was problematic only, will prove itself indispensable in
determining the concept of this supreme being ... (A 641 B 669)

If God is an ideal without a flaw, and if the deficiencies of speculative reason can be made good by practical reason, then God must be a really possible being, even if not one whose real possibility is provable a priori by conceptual analysis. And of course, if God is possible, then he is actually existent. Although we cannot know by speculative reason the possibility (and
hence the necessity) of God's existence, we can think it and believe it without contradiction. This implies that there is no contradiction in the concept
of a necessary being. It is a concept we can coherently think even if we can
neither prove nor disprove that it applies to anything.
As further support for (D, consider Kant's remark that "the absolute
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necessity of God" is a "mystery in rational religion."(LPT 163) Mysteries
are defined as "truths whose possibility reason cannot see into ...."(LPT 163)
Kant is thus committed to saying that God's absolutely necessary existence
is a truth, but not one into whose possibility reason can have any insight.
This again implies that the ens necessarium is possible.
One more passage, pages further along in the CPR than most ever get:
...we must recognize that while the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being is altogether inconceivable to us, and that every speculative proof of a necessary supreme being is therefore rightly to be
opposed on subjective grounds, we have yet no right to deny the possibility of such a primordial being in itself. .. (A792 B821, emphasis Kant's)
But other things that Kant says imply that there is a contradiction in the
concept of a necessary being, and thus that such a being is logically impossible. For if
a. Every existential judgment is synthetic a posteriori (A598 B626)
and
b. No synthetic 11 posteriori judgment can be necessary
it follows that
c. No existential judgment can be necessary
which implies that
d. No being can exist necessarily
whence we may infer that
e. The ens necessarium is impossible.
One may arrive at this conclusion in another way. Kant tells us that
" ... absolute necessity is an existence determined from mere concepts."
(A607 B635) So if anything exists of absolute necessity, then it should be
ontologically provable from its mere concept. But nothing is ontologically
provable from its mere concept. Therefore, nothing can exist of absolute
necessity.
To put it in still another way, the concept of a necessary being is a selfcontradictory one (hence one to which nothing can correspond) since, as a
concept it cannot entail existence, but as a concept of a Ilecessary being, i.e., a
being whose existence is determined from its concept, it must entail existence. In other words, the concept of a necessary being is the concept of a
thing whose existence is "determined from" its concept; but no concept is
the concept of a thing whose existence is "determined from" its concept.
Kant thus seems committed to both (i) and (ii). He is committed to say-
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ing both that the existence of God is really possible, though not theoretically provable, and that the existence of God is really impossible. Anyone
who does not see this tension, or thinks it can be easily resolved, has not
read Kant very closely and will not be able to understand his "watershed"
significance in the history of natural theology.
The tension is reflected in the way Kant criticizes the CA. The CAr like
the OAr must terminate in a logically (broadly logically, metaphysically)
necessary being. Now if a logically necessary being is one whose existence
follows from its concept, and if Kant is right that this move from concept to
existence is illegitimate, then there simply cannot be a logically necessary
being, and the CA collapses. Why then doesn't Kant simply deliver this
"radical criticism" of the CA (as Bennett calls it while endorsing it) thus
avoiding the rigmarole and fancy footwork of his actual argument?
The answer, I think, is that to deny the ens necessarium is as dogmatic as
to affirm it. Equivalently, it would be dogmatic to insist that all beings are
contingent, or that one has proved any such thing. The Critical path is a via
media between scepticism and dogmatism. Accordingly, Kant cannot be
interpreted as denying the possibility of an ens necessarium, or a being to
whose essence existence belongs. The EN and its possibility can neither be
proven nor disproven. We can think the EN (and must think it for moral
purposes), but we cannot know whether it is possible or impossible.
This explains why Kant, to put it anachronistically, did not give
Findlay's ontological disprooF" I would put Findlay's argument as follows:
A maximally perfect being cannot exist contingently.
Necessarily, everything that exists exists contingently.
Therefore
Necessarily, a maximally perfect being does not exist.
As Findlay came to realize in the fullness of time, this argument lacks probative force. 2" For how could anyone claim to know the minor? How
could one prove that, necessarily, everything (or every concrete individual)
exists contingently? That appears to be as far beyond us as a proof of the
real possibility of the ens realissimum.
If this is right, then Kant cannot flatly and dogmatically claim, as he
does in many places, that "absolute necessity is an existence determined
from mere concepts." For we have seen this dictum entail in a few short
steps the impossibility of the ellS necessarium. What he must say is something like: "absolute necessity for us can only be an existence determined
from mere concepts"; or, "the only absolute necessity into which we can
have any insight is an existence determined from mere concepts"; or, "the
only way we could know that there is a necessary being would be if
absolute necessity were an existence determined from mere concepts."
But if we make these backpedaling emendations, Kant's dependency
argument collapses. For the reason Kant thinks the cosmological argument depends on the ontological argument "from mere concepts" is
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because he thinks that an absolutely necessary being is one whose existence is "determined from mere concepts" (A 607 B 635), and is therefore
ontologically provable.
If there is a being whose absolutely necessity of existence is grounded,
not in concepts, but in its own essence or nature, then there is no longer
any reason to think that the CA depends on the OA "from mere concepts."
But as I showed in section 5 supra, the CA does depend on the OA from
possibili ty.
In sum, Kant's position is internally inconsistent. His dependency argument requires the assumption that absolute necessity is an existence determined from mere concepts. But his repeated assurances that the ER is possible, albeit unknowable, entail that absolute necessity is not an existence
determined from mere concepts. So Kant is committed to both affirming
and denying the assumption in question.

9. Where Do We Co from Here?
The main systematic (as opposed to exegetical) points to emerge from the
discussion in sections 5, 6, and 7 are that (i) the CA in its second half
depends for its probative force on the OA from possibility inasmuch as it
presupposes but cannot prove the real possibility of the ens rmlissimum; (ii)
the CA in its first half does so as well inasmuch as it presupposes but cannot prove the real possibility of the ens necessariulll; and (iii) both halves of
the CA depend for their probativeness on the OA from possibility inasmuch as there cannot be an a posteriori proof of a necessary proposition,
given Kant's stringent standards of proof.
We seem to face a dilemma with respect to the very possibility of the ens
necessarium. Either we prove its possibility from experience or we prove it
a priori. But we have seen that cosmo-theology fails to prove this possibility a posteriori just as onto-theology fails to prove it a priori. Onto-cosmology
may provide a way between the horns. Kant's 1763 argument for the existence of Cod is an example: it argues from the noncontingent existence of
possibilities (without which there could not be a world) to the existence of
Cod. 2? Curiously, Kant does not discuss this argument in the CPR. Was he
justified in rejecting it?28
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